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Government protection of the ftag of the United States is the 
most politically charged contemporary freedom of expression issue. 
President Bush believes that the Constitution should be amended to 
authorize punishment of ftag burning.' After Texas v. Johnson 2 
held ftag burning to be constitutionally protected, Congress tried to 
correct Johnson by statuteJ but the Supreme Court in United States 
v. Eichman4 found the new statute unconstitutional when applied to 
ftag burning as a form of political protest. After Eichman, both the 
House and the Senate rejected the proposed constitutional amend-
ments Republican party strategists used the amendment issue to 
put Democrats on the defensive in the 1990 elections. 6 
• Professor, Henry W. Grady College of Journalism and Mass Communication, Uni· 
versity of Georgia. 
I. President Bush announced that he was "viscerally" angered by flag desecration. 
Wall St. J., June 28, 1989, at Al6, col. I. For an explanation of the Bush Administration's 
views on the necessity of a constitutional amendment to protect the flag's symbolism, see 
Measures to Protect the Physical Integrity of the American Flag: Hearings Before the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, JOist CONG., 1st Sess. 118-19 (1989) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] 
(letter from Attorney General Thornburgh). See also id. at 69-89 (statement of Assistant 
Attorney General Barr). See generally, Statutory and Constitutional Responses to the 
Supreme Coun Decision in Texas v. Johnson: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and 
Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, JOist CONG., 1st Sess. (1989). 
2. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989). 
3. Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. JOI-131, 103 Stat. 777 (1989). President 
Bush allowed the measure to become law without his signature because he favors a constitu-
tional amendment. Statement on the Flag Protection Act of 1989, 25 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. 
Doc. 1619 (Oct. 26, 1989). 
4. 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990). 
5. For discussions of the amendment, see 136 CONG. REc. H3,996-4,029, H4,035-88 
(daily ed. June 21, 1990); S8,694-8,739 (daily ed. June 26, 1990). The Senate also rejected the 
amendment in 1989. 135 CoNG. REc. S13,733 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1989). See generally S. 
REP. No. 162, JOist CONG., 1st Sess. (1989). 
6. Wall St. J., June 12, 1990, at A22, col. I (stating that Republicans hope that the flag 
controversy will revive the party's effort to paint the Democrats as out of step with main-
stream views); N.Y. Times, June 22, 1990, at AI, col. 3 (the vote on the flag amendment may 
be only a prelude to an intense battle in the 1990 Congressional campaigns). President Bush 
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Johnson and Eichman answer a limited range of questions 
about the government's power to protect the flag. The cases leave 
unanswered many questions raised by other types of government 
efforts to protect the flag, such as protecting its physical integrity in 
all circumstances. 1 Are the questions raised by the types of laws 
not addressed in Johnson and Eichman answered by other Supreme 
Court cases? In his dissenting opinion in Johnson, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist cited San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States 
Olympic Committees (SFAA), where the Supreme Court upheld re-
strictions on the use of Olympic symbols, as precedent for govern-
ment actions protecting the flag.9 In testimony before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, Professor Tribe also drew upon SFAA, stat-
ing, "Now, you can't tell me there is more power in Congress to 
protect the Olympic flag than the American flag. That's non-
sense."to Both the Chief Justice and Professor Tribe have seriously 
misread SF AA. This Article demonstrates that SF AA is not relevant 
to current governmental efforts to protect the flag. 
I. SFAA 
The Amateur Sports Act of 1978 regulates relations among 
amateur sports organizations, establishes rights for amateur athletes 
and grants the United States Olympic Committee the power to con-
trol who uses Olympic emblems-such as the five interlocking 
rings-and words-such as "Olympic" -for certain promotional 
purposes.tt The USOC raises the bulk of the money to support 
American participation in the Olympics by granting licenses for the 
use of the emblems and words.l2 In SFAA, the USOC argued that 
the petitioner, sponsor of the "Gay Olympics," misappropriated its 
also announced that he would talk about the flag issue during the 1990 elections. 26 
WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 939 (June 12, 1990). 
7. Whether Congressional action to protect the flag is constitutional depends in large 
measure upon both the legislation's terms and its justifications. As Dean Stone pointed out, 
many of the questions raised by this issue take us "into essentially unexplored territory." 
Senate Hearings at 200, supra note 1 (statement of Geoffrey S~one). For an elaboration of his 
views, see Stone, Flag Burning and the Constitution, 15 IOWA L. REv. Ill (1989). 
8. 483 u.s. 522 (1987). 
9. 109 S. Ct. at 2552 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). In contrast, Justice Brennan's 
opinion for the Court in Johnson brushed SF AA aside, stating the case does not even begin to 
"tell us whether the Government may criminally punish physical conduct toward the flag 
engaged in as a means of political protest." /d. at 2545 n.IO. See infra text accompanying 
note 65. 
10. Senate Hearings at 146, supra note 1 (testimony of Professor Laurence Tribe). 
11. 36 U.S.C. §§ 371-96 (Supp. V 1981). 
12. /d. at 380. The USOC's financial statement for 1987 shows revenue of $35.5 mil-
lion. Corporate royalty payments amounted to $16.8 million. The USOC also received $2.7 
million to authorize television advertisers to display the USOC's marks during American 
telecasts of the 1988 Olympic games. The corporate royalty payments and television royalties 
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commercially valuable property. The USOC claimed that uncon-
trolled commercial use of "Olympic" would diminish the value of 
its marks and reduce its ability to raise funds.'3 The Supreme Court 
agreed, holding that the Amateur Sports Act authorized a perma-
nent injunction prohibiting use of the phrase "Gay Olympics."'4 
Further, the Court held that the Act did not violate the first amend-
ment.IS The Court's treatment of the questions of overbreadth and 
the fit between means and ends reveal the irrelevance of SF AA to 
the current flag controversy. 
A. OVERBREADTH 
The Amateur Sports Act's scope extends beyond trademark 
law: the USOC is not required to show that any unauthorized uses 
of its emblems and terms are likely to cause confusion, and while 
the Act grants the USOC remedies under trademark law, the unau-
thorized user does not have the traditional defenses to a trademark 
infringement action.'6 In its analysis of the statute, moreover, the 
Court blended trademark, dilution, and misappropriation concepts. 
First, the Court held that "Olympic" is not a generic term. That is, 
Congress could reasonably conclude that the commercial value of 
"Olympic" was created by the USOC. Because of this, Justice Pow-
ell found that the Congressional decision to grant the USOC a lim-
ited property right in "Olympic" was within the scope of 
Congressional power to protect trademarks.11 Second, the law's ap-
plication to nontrademark infringing uses was justified in antidilu-
tion terms.1s Justice Powell stated that even nonconfusing, 
noncommercial uses of "Olympic" could reasonably be regarded as 
lessening the distinctiveness and "thus the commercial value of the 
represented 55% of the USOC's 1987 revenue. DELOITIE, HASKINS & SELLS, UNITED 
STATES OLYMPIC COMMITIEE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 3 (Apr. 8, 1988). 
13. Brief for Respondents at 25-27, supra note 8. The Amateur Sports Act does not 
require that the USOC prove that unauthorized uses of "Olympic" cause harm; a court may 
presume harm to the USOC. International Olympic Comm. v. San Francisco Arts & Athlet-
ics, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 982, 986 (N.D. Cal. 1982), aff'd, 781 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1986), 
aff'd, 483 U.S. 522 (1987). 
14. 483 u.s. 532-35. 
15. /d. at 535-41. 
16. /d. at 531. 
17. /d. at 534-35. The rationale for exercising this power was stated in traditional 
trademark terms: the law insures that the USOC receives the benefit of its own efforts so that 
it "will have an incentive to continue to produce a 'quality product,' that, in tum, benefits the 
public." /d. at 537. For commentary on the Court's analysis of whether or not "Olympic" 
was a generic term, see Kravitz, Trademarks, Speech, and the Gay Olympic Case, 69 B.U.L 
REV. 131 (1989). 
18. Dilution statutes are based on the belief that nontrademark infringing uses nonethe-
less diminish the value of trademarks. The rationale for such laws was stated in Schecter, 
The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L REv. 813 (1927). 
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marks." 19 Finally, because unauthorized uses of "Olympic" in the 
context of athletic events invoke the image "carefully cultivated" by 
the USOC, such uses misappropriate the USOC's property.2o 
To Justice Powell, the Amateur Sports Act's reach beyond 
trademark law did not make the act unconstitutionally overbroad.2I 
The traditional chilling effect notion that underlies the overbreadth 
doctrine is best understood as resting on a judicial presumption in 
favor of free expression:22 The harm from a potential chill of con-
stitutionally protected speech exceeds the harm caused when unpro-
tected speech goes unpunished.23 Since the Court believes that 
commercial speech is "hardy," the chilling effect justification for 
overbreadth analysis applies "weakly, if at all" in the commercial 
speech context.24 Another reason the overbreadth presumption 
does not apply to the commercial speech is because the Court per-
ceives commercial speech as less important than fully protected 
types of expression.2s Commercial speech is analogous to nonob-
scene sexually-oriented expression: partially protected, but not 
worthy of the extraordinary protection offered by the overbreadth 
doctrine.26 In rejecting the petitioner's overbreadth claim, Justice 
Powell noted that the Act applies primarily to commercial speech.27 
The Court regards only statutes that are substantially over-
broad as facially invalid; that is, the breadth of an invalid statute 
must extend far beyond its legitimate sweep.2s Since the SFAA ma-
jority found the Act legitimately applied to commercial expression, 
19. 483 U.S. at 539. 
20. /d. at 541. In the trademark context, the rationale is that since the owner created 
the mark's value, others should not be able to benefit from its use. Denicola, Trademarks as 
Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade 
Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REv. 158, 166-81. Justice Powell, however, cited a nontrademark 
case, International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (misappropriation 
of news stories from a rival news service) for the misappropriation aspect of the case. 483 
U.S. at 541. 
21. 483 U.S. at 536 n.l5. 
22. Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect,'' 58 
B.U.L. REV. 685, 732 (1978). See also Redish, The Warren Court, the Burger Court and the 
First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 1031, 1041 (1983) (overbreadth 
doctrine rests upon the special position of first amendment rights); Note, The First Amend-
ment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REv. 844, 852 (1970) (the preferred status of expres-
sion is the ultimate rationale of the overbreadth doctrine). 
23. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 380 (1977). 
24. /d. In other settings the Court has also noted the limited applicability of the over-
breadth doctrine. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 760 (1974) (military context); 
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) (speech intertwined with conduct). 
25. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 n.5 
(1980). 
26. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 61 (1976). 
27. 483 U.S. at 539 & 536 n.l5. 
28. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615. Where a statute reaches a small range of protected 
activities, the Court believes the deterrence of protected expression will be minimal. New 
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the overbreadth question was whether the law substantially affected 
noncommercial expression. The Court found that the law had only 
a limited impact on noncommercial expression. That finding was 
bolstered by the following factors: 1) the perception that the 
SFAA's noncommercial, promotional uses of "Olympic" were part 
of the Act's legitimate core, and 2) an unwillingness to consider 
hypothetical applications of the Act and instead a determination to 
rely solely on its application to the litigant. 
With respect to the first factor, the Court deferred to the judg-
ment of Congress on the harm caused by noncommercial, promo-
tional uses of "Olympic." Congress reasonably could conclude, 
Justice Powell wrote, that such uses implicate the value created by 
the USOC.29 In particular, the SF AA was exploiting the imagery 
created by the USOC.Jo Regarding the second factor, the Court 
disregards a law's impact on the litigant and considers the impact 
on third parties only where there is substantial overbreadth.JI In 
SFAA the Court was uninterested in hypothetical applications of the 
Act because its application to noncommercial speech was limited. 
Most importantly, "purely expressive" uses of "Olympic" were not 
affected by the Act.J2 As an example of a "purely expressive" use, 
Justice Powell cited a case in which the Act was not violated by a 
group that used the USOC's symbols to oppose conversion of an 
Olympic facility into a jail.JJ While the SFAA claimed that its use 
of "Olympic" was intended to make a statement about the status of 
homosexuals in society,34 the Court was unwilling to treat the 
SFAA's activities as charitable or ideological solicitationJs or as 
"purely expressive," because the athletic contest was modeled after 
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 772 (1982). Professor Redish, however, questions this aspect of 
the overbreadth doctrine, Redish, supra note 22, at 1065. 
29. 483 U.S. at 540-41 & n.20. 
30. /d. at n.l9. 
31. Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947,959 (1984) (stating that 
unless a litigant can show that a statute is substantially overbroad, it has no "standing" to 
allege that, as applied to others, the statute might be unconstitutional). 
32. 483 U.S. at 536 & n.l4. At oral argument, counsel for the USOC emphasized that 
the statute did not reach discussions of public controversy such as "We protest the Olympic 
Games." Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, supra note 8. None of the Justices probed this 
point. 
33. Stop the Olympic Prison v. United States Olympic Comm., 489 F. Supp. 1112 
(S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
34. The SFAA used the term "Olympic" to describe its athletic competition because it 
conveyed the format of the event and described the SF AA 's goals of "peace, friendship and 
positive social interaction." Brief for Petitioners at 6, supra note 8. 
35. The Court regards ideological or charitable solicitation as noncommercial speech 
and closely scrutinizes regulation of such solicitation. See Riley v. National Fed'n of the 
Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988). The SFAA Court was unwilling to treat the SFAA's activities as 
protected because of the "exploitation" of the USOC's marks. The Court rejected SFAA's 
argument that its nonprofit status affected the case: "But when the question is the scope of a 
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the Olympics.36 Had the SFAA merely burned the Olympic flag to 
protest discrimination against homosexuals, the Court likely would 
have treated the action as protected speech; the sponsorship of an 
athletic event, however, even when intended to make a political 
statement, was not regarded as "purely expressive." 
Justice Brennan's dissent found the Act overbroad because it 
prohibited noncommercial uses of "Olympic" to promote athletic 
and theatrical events, even when those events are aimed at educat-
ing the public about social and political ideas.37 The range of non-
commercial promotional speech affected by the Act included 
"critical reviews of theatrical performances, anticipatory notices 
and descriptions in the media of athletic competitions, and distribu-
tion of educational literature describing the sociopolitical reasons 
for holding the public events."Js In Justice Brennan's view, non-
confusing and good faith descriptive uses-which do not violate 
trademark rights-were impermissibly prohibited by the Act.39 
The dispute between Justice Powell and Justice Brennan in 
SF AA hinges on the communicative importance of "Olympic" and 
the harm caused by noncommercial, promotional uses. Justice 
Brennan regarded "Olympic" as a unique term with a deep history 
in our language and culture. 40 Further, he found no evidence in the 
record to suggest that trademark law was insufficient to protect the 
USOC from economic harm.4t Justice Powell, though, thought 
that there were other ways for the SF AA to express its views about 
the status of homosexuals in society; the SF AA was merely exploit-
ing the "commercial magnetism" of "Olympic," a word which 
would decline in value through uncontrolled use.42 
B. REASONABLENESS 
Justice Brennan's dissent raises an interesting question: given 
the existence of less restrictive laws, such as the federal trademark 
law and state dilution statutes, was the Amateur Sports Act broader 
than necessary? The majority was uninterested in whether less re-
strictive laws would sufficiently protect the USOC. Instead, it was 
satisfied that Congress considered the Act to be necessary. That 
legitimate property right in a work, the SFAA's distinction [between nonprofit and for profit 
groups] is inapposite." 483 U.S. at 541 n.19. 
36. 483 U.S. at 540 & n.18. 
37. /d. at 567-68 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
38. /d. at 566 n.28. 
39. /d. at 563-66. 
40. /d. at 569. 
41. /d. at 572. 
42. 483 U.S. at 536, 539-40. 
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analysis was largely dictated by the Court's determination that the 
Act would be scrutinized under the commercial speech and O'Brien 
tests. 
Commercial speech regulations must be no greater than neces-
sary.43 This prong of the commercial speech test requires that the 
fit between the legislature's ends and the means chosen to accom-
plish those ends be reasonable, a standard that "requires something 
short of a least-restrictive-means standard."44 Similarly, the 
O'Brien test for content-neutral restrictions4s has a no-greater-than-
necessary prong that is easily satisfied. 46 A central aspect of both 
the commercial speech and O'Brien tests is the Court's deference to 
the judgment of the legislature. For example, in Posadas de Puerto 
Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. 47 the Court held that a ban on casino 
gambling advertising was valid even though less restrictive means of 
discouraging gambling, such as government-sponsored an-
tigambling messages, were not employed. The Court stated, "[ w ]e 
think it is up the legislature to decide whether or not such a 
'counterspeech' policy would be as effective in reducing the demand 
for casino gambling as a restriction on advertising."4s In United 
States v. Albertini 49 the Court upheld a protester's exclusion from a 
military base open house even though less restrictive methods of 
protecting the base's security existed. The Court held that under 
O'Brien, the validity of regulations "does not turn on a judge's 
agreement with the responsible decision maker concerning the most 
appropriate method for promoting significant government 
interests. "so 
In SF AA the Court applied the commercial speech test to those 
aspects of the Act affecting commercial speech and the O'Brien test 
to those aspects affecting noncommercial speech. Since the two 
tests are substantially similar,s1 the Court merely required that the 
law do no more than promote the governmental interest. Thus, it 
was hardly surprising that the Court uncritically stated that Con-
gress could reasonably have determined that the commercial and 
noncommercial aspects of the Act were no broader than 
43. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Cornrn'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980). 
44. Board of Trustees v. Fox, 109 S. Ct. 3028, 3033 (1989). 
45. 391 u.s. 367, 377 (1968). 
46. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2758 (1989). 
47. 478 u.s. 328 (1986). 
48. /d. at 344. 
49. 472 u.s. 675 (1985). 
50. /d. at 689. 
51. 483 U.S. at 537 n.16. 
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necessary.s2 
The choice of the O'Brien test ensured that the noncommercial 
aspects of the Act would not be subjected to a more stringent test 
than the test applied to those aspects affecting commercial speech.s3 
Why the Court selected O'Brien is significant. The Court regarded 
the Act's restrictions as incidentals4 to the "primary congressional 
purpose of encouraging and rewarding the USOC's activities."ss 
That is, this was not a suppression of expression to protect onlook-
ers from offense, or some similar message-related rationale, this was 
a suppression that was justified in nonmessage-related terms. The 
broader goal of the Act is to advance the Olympic movement and 
the Act served this goal by supplying the USOC with the means to 
raise money for American participation.s6 Moreover, the restric-
tions did not stand by themselves, but were part of a comprehensive 
statute that regulated amateur sports. A ban on unauthorized uses 
of "Olympic" has the same impact on speech whether the ban regu-
lates only expression or whether it regulates expression along with 
the rights of amateur athletes and relations among amateur sports 
organizations. The difference between the two laws is that the com-
prehensive law is justified by a more significant interest than the law 
that restricts only expression. Also, a comprehensive law is more 
easily justified in content-neutral terms, and may not easily be 
viewed as underinclusive. 
Justice Brennan's dissent operated from a different perspective: 
52. /d. at 539. That the Court was especially uninterested in considering whether the 
Act's contours were broader than necessary is revealed by the following comment concerning 
the ban on theatrical promotions: 
Although a theatrical production is not as closely related to the primary use of 
the word by the USOC as is an athletic event, Congress reasonably could have 
found that when the word "Olympic" is used to promote such a production, it 
would implicate the value given to the word by the USOC. 
/d. at 541 n.20. 
53. In Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981), the Court dissected 
a billboard ordinance and treated those aspects regulating commercial speech differently from 
those aspects regulating noncommercial speech. 
54. The Court uses the term in different ways. Sometimes the Court describes inciden-
tal restrictions as those that have an indirect or unintended effect on expression. See, e.g., 
Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 789 n.5 (1988). See also Clark v. Commu-
nity for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 n.8 (1984) (camping regulation affecting 
both expressive and nonexpressive acts described as having an mcidental impact on speech). 
The Court also describes direct regulations of expression that have only a slight impact on 
expressive opportunities as incidental. City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 
466 U.S. 789, 808 (1984) (ordinance aimed only at signs). SFAA dealt with a direct restric-
tion on expressive activity. The SFAA Court's reference to the restriction on "Olympic" as 
incidental is most likely both a reference to the slight impact on communicative opportunity 
and the fact that the restriction was an accompanying circumstance of legislation to foster 
American participation in the Olympics. 
55. 483 U.S. at 536 (note omitted). 
56. /d. at 538-39. 
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the Court rather than Congress should decide whether less restric-
tive measures are inadequate to protect the asserted interests.57 He 
claimed that there was no evidence in the record that trademark 
law was insufficient to protect the USOC from economic harm, nor 
was there evidence that the SF AA's use of "Olympic" harmed the 
reputation of the USOC.ss Further, the USOC failed to prove that 
the California dilution statute was insufficient to protect the 
USOC's marks from loss of distinctivenesss9 or that disclaimers 
would be ineffective. 60 
II. CONCLUSION 
SF AA is irrelevant to the current debate about the measures 
necessary to protect the flag's symbolism. The Bush Administra-
tion and Congress are unconcerned with commercial exploitation of 
the flag's symbolism. Yet SFAA is a commercial speech case bear-
ing a striking resemblance to Posadas6t (decided only a year ear-
lier); both cases rest on the premise that restrictions on certain types 
of nondeceptive commercial speech are easily justified. Certainly a 
central attribute of the Court's current free speech doctrine is that 
commercial speech is subject to "modes of regulation that might be 
impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression. "62 
SF AA represents a special extension of trademark law. The 
concept of commercially valuable property permeated the Court's 
treatment of the law's limited impact on noncommercial expression. 
Because of SFAA's emphasis on commercially valuable property, 
the dilution aspect of SFAA is far removed from concerns that flag 
destruction dilutes the symbolic value of the flag.63 
SF AA speaks to the question of the government's authority to 
offer limited protection to symbols created by others.64 The Court's 
analysis of SF AA surely would have been different if purely political 
speech had been affected by the statute. As long as the Court main-
tains a first amendment distinction between commercial speech and 
57. /d. at 572-73 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
58. !d. at 572 & n.36. 
59. /d. at 564 n.25. 
60. /d. at 572. 
61. 478 u.s. 328 (1986). 
62. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978). 
63. Similarly, the Court's treatment of misappropriation is phrased in terms of commer-
cially valuable property. See, e.g., 483 U.S. at 541 (quoting International News Serv. v. Asso-
ciated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239-40 (1918)) (emphasizing the commercial value of news 
reports). 
64. For arguments that the first amendment limits the scope of trademark rights, see 
Denicola, supra note 20; Kravitz, supra note 17; Note, Trademark Parody: A Fair Use and 
First Amendment Analysis, 72 VA. L. REV. 1079 (1986). 
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political speech, a flag protection law affecting political speech 
presents issues entirely different from those addressed in SFAA. 
The majority opinion in both Johnson and Eichman recognize this. 
For example, the Court in Eichman stated, "We deal here with con-
cededly political speech and have no occasion to pass on the validity 
of laws regulating commercial exploitation of the image of the 
United States flag. "6s 
Central to SFAA is the content-neutral justification for there-
striction: the government asserted a content-neutral interest be-
yond merely protecting "Olympic" as a symbol. Although 
Congress rewrote the federal flag law in an attempt to eliminate 
many of the content-based features that led to invalidation in the 
Texas case, its justification for flag protection remained in content-
based terms.66 Even a flag law justified in content-neutral terms 
raises questions about the government's ability to protect its own 
symbols. Those questions are unanswered by SFAA. Acknowledg-
ing the limitations of SF AA is not to say that the Constitution must 
be amended to protect the flag's symbolism. Rather, it is to recog-
nize that the type of symbol and speech at issue in SF AA are unlike 
the type of symbol and speech of concern to the Bush 
Administration. 
65. 110 S. Ct. at 2408 n.4. See aw id. at n.6 (distinguishing harm caused by commer-
cial appropriation of the image of the flag from harm caused by flag burning). Counsel for 
Eichman conceded at oral argument that Congress could prohibit use of the flag for commer-
cial purposes. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, supra note 4. 
66. 110 S. Ct. at 2408. 
